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AbstRAct Resumen
This article presents three elements that intend to 
explain scholarly generalizations about Africa. It be-
gins by noting that excessive reliance on statistical 
analysis might account for much enthusiastic lit-
erature on the continent that makes generalizations 
with little theoretical backing. It then points to flaws 
within current discussions of State performance 
(i.e. State fragility) and its measurement, and sug-
gests that this concept serves to explain a quite 
relaxed approach to the “African State problem” 
that ignores causes, intensities and logistical rela-
tions. The article concludes by describing how the 
widespread use of a utilitarian rationality to explain 
African realities creates an illusion of neatness in 
comparative politics that leaves out some seminal 
information that exceeds the model’s analytical 
parameters. 
En este artículo se presentan tres mecanismos que 
explican las generalizaciones académicas sobre 
África. En primer lugar, destaca un exceso de con-
fianza en el análisis estadístico que podría explicar 
la existencia de un tipo de literatura ingenua pero 
entusiasta que realiza generalizaciones sin una 
sólida fundamentación teórica. Luego, examina el 
vacío en las discusiones sobre el desempeño del 
Estado (fragilidad estatal) y su forma de medición; 
el artículo sugiere aque dicho vacío explica una 
aproximación bastante relajada al “problema del 
Estado Africano” que ignora causas, intensidades 
y relaciones logísticas. En la parte final, describe 
cómo el extendido uso de la racionalidad utilitarista 
para explicar la realidad africana, crea una ilusión 
de precisión en la política comparada que deja por 
fuera información seminal que “no encaja” en el 
modelo.
Keywords: Africa, generalization, social mechanisms,
rational maximization.
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** I shall use Africa instead of Sub-Saharan Africa to simplify redaction. I thank Phillomen Na-
kyazze for corrections and comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Some predictions were based on far-fetched arithmetical calculations, involving 
the figures of the year, the total of deaths, and the number of months the plague 
had so far lasted. Others made comparisons with the great pestilences of former 
times, drew parallels (which the forecasters called “constants”), and claimed to de-
duce conclusions bearing on the present calamity. But our most popular prophets 
were undoubtedly those who in an apocalyptic jargon had announced sequences 
of events, any one of which might be construed as applicable to the present State 
of affairs, and was abstruse enough to admit of almost any interpretation. 
The plague, Albert Camus
“Generalization about Africa has rendered a great disservice to African development”. A well known policy advisor in Uganda made this remark during an open discussion about “African politics”1 which 
I had with him. While undertaking research on East African politics and having 
already reviewed various literature, it was apparent the African-wide approach 
had largely ignored social mechanisms and research areas that I considered 
fundamental in explaining developments within the political arena in that part 
of Africa. From time to time I found myself reading with derision grandiose 
generalizations and pieces of arguably flawed policy advice emanating from 
various sources. I perceive a series of structural problems in the approach taken 
by different analysts in their attempt to understand issues regarding African 
political problems and thus tempted to suggest that Africa as such may not 
constitute a satisfactory unit of analysis from the political point of view. With 
only few exceptions,2 most of the studies using Africa as their analytical frame-
work failed to deduce concrete proven final explanations3 of the underlying 
problems to what seems a vicious cycle of political mayhem in various coun-
tries on the African continent. It was during the conversation with the policy 
advisor that it struck me on the need to urgently undertake research to unearth 
reasons why scholars still insist on producing scholarly material about “Africa” 
that largely seems to be inconclusive and/or significantly flawed. 
1 I thank this and other valuable comments to Mr. Charles Lwanga Ntale.
2 See for instance Mamdani’s outstanding works on the Bifurcated State in Africa (Citizen and 
Subject: 1996), and the analysis on the Post-colonial dynamic of exclusion of Subject classes 
and political identities (Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: 2001).
3 By final explanations I take those that we perceive as “evident” in the psychological sense or 
testable in the empirical way. Boudon (1996).
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The present study therefore seeks to offer triple answers to question: Why 
do scholars produce scholarly material about African political aspects which 
seems to be largely inconclusive and/or significantly flawed? It begins by 
annotating apparently excessive confidence attached to statistical analysis that 
might account for the overly enthusiastic literature characterized by political 
generalizations with little theoretical support about political trends in Africa. 
The study then points to the existing gagged discussions on State performance 
(State fragility) and how this is measured. The article then suggests that this 
gag serves to explain a quite relaxed approach to the “African State problem” 
that ignores causes, intensity and logistical implications. In the final part, the 
article describes how the widespread use of a utilitarian rationality to explain 
African reality creates an illusion of neatness in comparative politics that leaves 
out some seminal information pertinent to explaining the changing dynamics 
of specific country cases. 
A modest suggestion for improvement of the scholarly approach to African 
politics is attached at the end of each part. This article advocates for a gen-
eral fragmentation of the African unit in more realistic (even respectful) units 
of analysis; a “logistical approach” to the definition of State fragility; and the 
advancement of research based on social mechanisms under the assumption 
that rational behaviour refers to all decisions assumed by the individual as 
meaningful.
The Onion, a famous newspaper in the United States specialized in fake and 
hilarious news, once published a piece of news claiming the U.S. State Depart-
ment provided aid funds to Andorra, falsely believing it was located in Africa. 
Some commentators in the paper indicated the likelihood of such events occur-
ring in future since it still seems difficult to fully comprehend the complexity of 
such a vast region where some countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or Sudan are as large as the whole of Western Europe.
Although this article does not blatantly argue that the ignorance of Africa is 
behind all the problems related to theorizing about it, there are widespread 
assumptions that somehow Africa can be explained as a whole. Wholesome 
generalization of Africa can be seen when political or economic trends through-
out a region are taken in totality (statistical analysis) or by assuming problems 
faced by the society in the region (dictatorship, poverty, corruption, etc.) are a 
shared problem. From this perspective Africa is a continent in which some nasty 
dictators affecting every thread of society must be controlled and generally 
weak civil society organizations must be supported (depending on what theory 
is fashionable to explain problems in the Third World). In an apparent rebuttal 
to Professor Mamdani’s LRB piece about Zimbabwe (2005), around thirty 
professors from universities across the world expressed in quite strong lan-
guage (dishonest, posturing) their concern for the author’s apparent support to 
Mugabe. In their view, Mugabe was a (typical) brutal dictator that deserved to 
be opposed by all democratic forces. Mamdani replied indicating that whether 
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he favoured Mugabe or not was beside the point as he was only trying to: “free 
the debate about Zimbabwe from the narrow confines of a regime-opposition 
polemic by understanding Mugabe’s survival as part of a far bigger picture: that 
of land reform and the historic struggles which underpin it”. 
What signatories to the letter were defending was democracy rather than 
research. They implied that in trying to explain the situation in Zimbabwe, 
especially by demonstrating some significant popular support for Mugabe’s 
regime, there was potential danger embedded in the direct or indirect support 
that could perpetuate the tenure of yet another brutal dictator in Africa. Accord-
ing to Mamdani’s critics if something was ever needed to stop the loss of life 
and human rights abuses in Africa, it was the need to have a clear purpose – a 
political concern and in their opinion Mamdani was not the right scholar in this 
regard. In this respect Africa is still a concept allowing generalizations – evil 
vs good, dictators vs civil society, press freedom vs ethnic hatred. Africa thus 
remains a place appropriate for labelling instead of explaining. 
This discussion brings to the fore precisely why “Africa” has rendered a great 
disservice to Africans. The exchange between a Professor specialized in quali-
tative-historical research and a group of scholars specialized in African politics 
bring to the fore the point made in this article; A discussion about a specific 
country in Africa – irrespective of whether it is located in East, West, South, 
Central or North Africa brings to the centre of the debate the very ways in which 
we study and approach the African continent.
1. eXceSSive confidence in StatiStical analySiS
Africa is usually analysed from a statistical perspective. Trend analysis (tenden-
cies) and regression models are widely used as empirical research on observed 
data. Usually ‘Africanists’ aim to determine if there are working correlations 
between democracy and other variables such as international aid, democratic 
events (elections), economical growth, etc., for a certain time span. Some key 
data sources such as Polity and Freedom house4 serve as democracy indexes, 
while other datasets generate indications of economical growth, party frag-
mentation, and so on. The critical challenge here is to provide convincing 
explanations accounting for observed trends or correlations that are representa-
tively authentic and binding throughout Africa 
This article does not suggest that statistical analyses about Africa are not useful, 
nor is it the intention of this article to question quantitative approaches in social 
sciences. The purpose of this article is simply to show why statistical analysis 
often fails to provide convincing explanations of both the observed trends and 
4 Freedom house dataset is available at: www.fredomhouse.org/. Polity IV dataset is available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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the data collected in Africa. The article uses some examples to illustrate how 
excessive confidence in statistical analysis produces flawed analysis. The article 
suggests oversimplification, analytical irrelevance and excessive subjective de-
termination as the three major problems confronting the explanatory capacity 
of statistical analysis in relation to trends on the African continent. 
The first problem is oversimplification
It is indeed a particularly weighty responsibility on the researcher to provide a 
convincing explanation of what the trends or the statistical models indicate for 
48 countries. A necessary conclusion is that there is hardly any study with final, 
convincing explanations. A reader’s common test would be to recall a particular 
country that does not fit in the explanation provided. Even when authors try 
their best to highlight differences and subtleties, they end up making quite 
untenable remarks in their quest to explain Africa. 
example 1: van del valle and the african party System5
I shall try to illustrate oversimplification with Nicolas van del Valle’s article: 
“Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems” (Van del 
Valle, 2003). This article is especially suitable to point the problems associated 
with oversimplification given his reliance on three already common descriptors 
of African politics-illiberal nature, presidentialism and clientelism.
Briefly the author identifies three trends in Africa using a data base of 87 
legislative elections in the 1990’s. “[1] Parties that won founding elections are 
almost invariably still in power, […] [2] the typical emerging party system has 
consisted of a dominant party surrounded by a large number of small, unstable 
parties and […] [3] party cleavages have been overwhelmingly ethno-linguistic 
in nature, while ideological and programmatic debates have been muted and 
rare.” Then the article provides three reasons explaining those trends: “[1] The 
illiberal nature of most of the new African democracies, [2] their characteristic 
centralization of power around the presidency, and [3] the pervasive clientelism 
that structures the relationship between the State and the citizenry.”
In reviewing these three reasons behind the trends observed I will try to point 
some problems of oversimplification that led the author to unsatisfactory ex-
planations. 
5 Apart from the example provided see Azam (2001), [The fundamental problem confronting 
African States is how to substitute State-provided services for ethnic capital in the long run, 
starting with a string endowment of the latter]. For other statistical generalization with little 
explanatory capacity see, Collier, P. & Anke, H. (1999) and Mattes, R., Bratton, M. (2007). [To 
the extent that new democracies can open up and protect space for people to live their lives 
free of interference by overweening states, they may be able to begin a “virtuous cycle” of 
democratic development].
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On the illiberal nature of most of the new African democracies, the author 
says most African democracies can barely be called liberal democracies. To 
support this assertion he points to their poor quality as political freedoms 
and civil rights are formally recognized but imperfectly observed in practice. 
Twelve multi party systems in the author’s view deserve to be called “pseudo 
democracies” and eighteen more “partly free”. Africa through these remarks 
appears to be a single federation of poorly administered States. Remarkably 
Van del Valle annotates that out of all the African countries a quarter can be 
considered liberal democracies. At face value we are entitled to ask why a 
quarter of African countries should still be included in the analysis. Which 
countries is he referring to? When explaining Africa, a quarter is not an insig-
nificant portion to overlook. 
But even as we assume that the analysis only applies to three quarters of the 
original intended sample there is another problem with the explanation based 
on the illiberal nature of most of the new African democracies. As the analysis is 
either based upon general observations or Freedom House scores we are never 
provided with a clear definition on what the liberal nature of a democracy is. In 
fact, the author twist the argument by indicating that it is the observed political 
competition that explains the emerging quality of democracy (“The lower the 
level of competition, in other words, the more likely the emergence of illiberal 
democracy”); but as we noted it was the quality of democracy that was sup-
posed to be the basis to explain the kind of competition observed.
This problem of circularity in the argument regarding the illiberal nature of 
African democracies becomes especially significant as the author indicates that 
“dominant parties took advantage of their positions of strength […] to con-
solidate their hold on power at the expense of political and civil rights”. But 
if the quality of democracy was supposed to explain the kind of competition 
observed, why then suggest that the dominant parties in fact undermined the 
quality of democracy? This unwarranted oversimplification is paradoxical to say 
the least.
Following on “Presidentialism” the author briefly highlights the overwhelming 
role of the President and a small clique of elite cronies dominating power in Af-
rica. It is presumed: “The president is above the law”. However, this interesting 
description provides no explanation about how a single person and a handful 
of subordinates manage to dominate and manipulate not only the State but also 
the entire political system. Is it true “Presidentialism” is the cause of all observed 
political trends? Interestingly, if we swap cause and effect, another possible 
scenario emerges. Indeed, presidentialism might be the consequence (not the 
cause) of a political system with a single dominant party that is only challenged 
by some small competitors in a remarkably low ideological confrontation (Tan-
zania seems to fit here). It however seems Van del Valle took an observed fact 
– the relative strength of the president, and then assumed its single direction 
causality effect on the observed trends accruing for the entire region. 
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This brings us to the last cause mentioned by Van del Valle: “clientelism”-the 
cost-minus-benefit incentive which informs politician’s decision either to stay 
within the dominant party or to form a small one in order to have some leverage 
against the president’s party. Here the author discards virtuosity by pointing 
to the low trend of ideological debates. To prove this point he indicates that 
“most parties have adopted vague populism during elections; […] Ideological 
differences have been minor across parties.” Studies from Ghana, Benin, Niger, 
Malawi and Chad support this assertion.
In Uganda one politician from the dominant party (NRM) narrated the “use” of 
some of the minor parties in the electoral system: “we take their criticisms to 
improve the government policies and so we appreciate what they do even as 
they are not prepared to lead”. It is therefore not necessarily naïve as a scholar 
to conceive a politician leading a minority party to influence policy. This article 
strongly holds the view that to some extent this is happening in Uganda: several 
small parties are struggling to offer credible political options confronting a 
dominant party. Thus, “clientelism”, in spite all its explanatory versatility, is 
unjustifiably stretched to constitute an ideal explanation of the political and 
policy decisions made in Africa. Clientelism is therefore a simplified illusion that 
seeks to counter reality. 
the second problem confronting statistical analysis on africa 
relates to analytical relevance 
Statistical models prove or discard theoretical propositions and research ques-
tion. But it is often the case that the theoretical framework used to verify 
research questions in Africa are based on models previously designed to explain 
some historical developments in the West. Statistical analysis in this regard 
will be based upon inherited but apparently false assumptions based upon 
comparative politics technically referred to as analogical historiography. By 
either proving or discarding the level of similarity in African trends, statistical 
analysis ends up establishing only the degree of resemblance without appreci-
ating social dynamics that could have significant bearings on the occurrence of 
various trends. The fact that these theoretical assumptions are never discussed 
in depth, neither informed by qualitative research advanced in Africa opens a 
Pandora box when attempting to contrast “African common sense” with avail-
able datasets. Deductions based upon flawed theoretical assumptions renders 
such conclusions remotely detached from real and distinctive characteristics 
that characterise various social, economic and political aspects in Africa.
This is not to say that social mechanisms in Africa should be entirely idio-
syncratic (although the complexity of each and every one society warrants 
some level of it). Actually “Exotic Africa” is not the solution; it is also part of 
the problem. However, when statistical or trend analysts only consider social 
mechanisms as explained in other societies when undertaking research on 
Africa, they inevitably end up at looking for similar trends at most and not 
explanations of occurring phenomena. 
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It is the opinion of this article that very few “imported mechanisms”, however 
elaborate or powerful they may be, constitute useful explanatory capacity that 
is empirically valid or realistic in this sense to explain the occurrence of some 
or a series of political trends throughout the entire continent. A few works such 
as Class struggle (Marx), Bifurcated States (Mamdani), Free Markets (various 
authors) attempt. But even with these; there is need for extreme caution and scru-
tiny. There is need to ardently examine the extent these works seek to genuinely 
answer questions in the quest to find out underlying factors explaining the oc-
currence of various phenomena from an African perspective or context related. 
There is a likelihood that such undertakings, if any; might serve better explana-
tory insights when applied to more in-depth studies in homogeneous regions 
within Africa.
the last problem facing statistical analysis on an african-wide 
perspective is subjective over-determination
This is not singularly caused by problems of conceptualization (as discussed in 
the second part of this article) but also by the limitations of the possible sample 
dominated by the scholar. 
The problem is not so much as to whether there is a sacred definition or basis 
upon which every scholar agrees to measure or explain political trends but 
rather whether it can be said that the scholar is not biased in his measurement 
or explanation of these various trends by his actual knowledge of the various 
countries in Africa (Note the awkward identification of a scholars as “Africanists”, 
reminiscent of “Orientalists” denounced be Edward Said). Frequently the 
variables or trends are actually constructed or determined using discrete (dis-
connected) quantifications whereby the author assigns a “mark” to different 
criteria, then adds, subtracts or takes their average (explanations for doing such 
operations are rarely given). The greater the number of countries “measured” 
against unwarranted calculations, the greater the number of errors in the out-
come. The mirage of portraying accurate and distinct African trends does not 
impede the analysts from giving farfetched explanations. 
example 2: michael bratton and africa’s divergent transitions
I will illustrate the third problem with statistical analysis (subjective over-de-
termination) using Bratton’s answer on why some African countries succeeded 
in acquiring democratic regimes while others failed (Bratton, 1997). Professor 
Bratton indicates: 
[…] the most basic requirement for democracy is that citizens are empowered 
to choose and remove leaders […] a transition to democracy is held to have 
occurred [in Africa] with the installation of a national government chosen 
on the basis of one competitive election, as long as that election is freely 
and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties and all the contestants 
accept the validity of the election results.
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Unfortunately, Bratton does not tell us what should be done to empower citi-
zens to choose and remove leaders and nor does he accord us the opportunity 
to understand what “matrix of civil liberties” is let alone how is it supposed to 
be measured. However, the author indicates, that it is used within the definition 
to ensure: “that elections are not merely formalistic exercises in the uncontested 
ratification of incumbents.”
Democracy was also not defined. In the context of the article we must believe 
that democracy is taking place in countries where citizens have been empowered 
to choose and remove leaders. This is demonstrated by the holding of periodic 
elections conducted within a matrix of civil liberties. In Bratton's view nothing 
short of an election is worth calling democracy; “as no other democratic institu-
tion precedes elections, either in timing or importance; they are the sine qua 
non of democracy, a necessary condition without which democracy cannot 
otherwise be born.”
But Bratton’s stance seems to be highly deceptive. Even if elections seem to be the 
most obvious feature of democracy, it is quite misleading to equate democracy 
to elections (sine qua non). Even if we are required to take into account that 
those elections should be embedded within a matrix of civil liberties (China 
may not be a good example but it will not be surprising if South Africa under 
the apartheid might actually qualify); we do not know how these civil liberties 
are supposed to be assessed (who, how, etc.), neither how they are supposed 
to come into existence. We are not also told whether civil liberties are forerun-
ners of democracy. In fact it seems that when Bratton mentions civil liberties he 
is signifying the way in which they currently exist in the First World. But here 
we might ask are civil liberties (even accepting a very gross definition of them) 
to be imposed upon countries before democracy (elections) takes place? Is this 
really possible? 
The real problem here is that when a concept like democracy is “barely” ex-
tracted from a certain reality and analyzed in a relatively different one, we run 
the risk of ignoring history, particularly the history of distinct African countries. 
By assuming democracy is equal to elections and that civil liberties precede 
elections, we are tacitly provided with a paradox, that democracy is indepen-
dent of civil liberties.
Even if it is highly commendable to define concepts we are dealing with or to 
define them in terms of their most prominent features, it is important that while 
doing so ”standard” perspectives must be tested against social mechanisms in a 
bid to ensemble explanations within historical and/or contextual perspectives. 
What comes first (which quite often becomes what should be done first) is a very 
complex issue that should not to be decided casually. Otherwise comparative 
analysis becomes biased pseudo-historical explanations based upon erroneously 
correlated concepts, leading to flawed policy. As Bertrand Russell indicated: 
“when he thinks he is recording observations about the outer world, he is really 
recording observations about what is happening in him.” (Russell, 1992). 
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It is not surprising that the author ended up categorizing (as of 31st of December 
1994) Uganda as being as undemocratic as Mobutu’s Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Rwanda (few months after the genocide), and even less democratic 
than Kenya, Mozambique and Cape Verde. The fact is that Uganda had signifi-
cant strides towards democracy as a result of various reforms that had already 
been implemented at by the Museveni’s Government (Mamdani would have 
called the reforms a truly democratic revolution: 1996). If we were to take seri-
ously the author’s classification –according to his quantitative model– Uganda 
would erroneously be only slightly better than Sudan and Liberia.
But this is not the only case in which misleading conceptualization can lead to 
flawed statistical analysis and problematic readings. When describing how co-
hesive opposition won power in all but one election, Professor Bratton comes 
to a twofold conclusion. First, where opposition was cohesive elections were 
honest and so opposition won. Second, where the opposition was fragmented 
the elections were flawed and so they lost. 
What distinguished virtuous from corrupt elections? The effects of opposi-
tion cohesion remained consistent: of the fifteen countries with cohesive 
oppositions, only one experienced a problematic poll. In all other cases, 
relatively cohesive opposition movements provided an institutional coun-
terweight to electoral manipulation. They helped to keep elections honest.
There is another explanation that is simply not considered. The opposition 
might have never actually come together perceiving it mission impossible to 
defeat the incumbent. In any case it is reasonable to think that people opposing 
Government will spend little political resources in making a coalition if defeat 
is apparent or guaranteed. In other words, it is highly likely that a cohesive 
coalition will only emerge if there is a reasonable expectation that it is possible 
to win. 
Bratton’s article, for all its brilliance, is therefore simply dangerously over-
stretched to try to capture adequate explanations of the diverging political 
transitions throughout Africa.
In ending this section it is worth quoting Sørensen’s lamentation. “Fascination, if 
not an obsession” in reference to statistical models and concerns, neglects “the 
need to develop sociological models mirroring conceptions of mechanisms of 
social processes” leading to statistical models with “a conceptually meaningless 
list of variables preventing any kind of substantive conclusion.” (Sørensen, 1998)
Thus, it is the opinion of this article that analyses based on statistical evidence on 
a wide-African political dimension runs the risk to become highly detached from 
reality. A mistaken lesson extracted from the demise of communism was that 
empirical research detached from ideological confrontations was synonymous 
of numerical analysis. Communism was the result of obsession with the social 
mechanism of Class Struggle. Marxism passed dangerously from historical analysis 
to political commitment. So in order to avoid this dangerous transformation of 
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explanations into ideologies, statistical analysis was to serve as containment. 
Mathematical observations were bound to be ideologically free, scientifically 
correct. 
The problem with this idea, as highlighted above, is that statistical analysis is 
based upon previous theoretical assumptions. Numbers say little in a theoretical 
void. Neoliberal assumptions as well as Marxist ones can be encapsulated in 
statistical analysis and still offer the appearance of being ideologically-free. 
In this sense statistical analysis should be more accountable in its theoretical 
foundations.
Africa, even in numbers, still needs explanations, and they are not easily pro-
vided by statistical analysis. In the best case scenario African-wide statistical 
analysis serves to inform much more than to explain. 
2. meaSuring and comparing State fragility
Africa is visited frequently to determine the bottom lines in terms of State fra-
gility (Somalia, Congo, Angola, etc.). Some generalizations emerge, but they 
usually appear short of explanatory power for specific country cases. I will 
emphasize in this section the fact that some approaches to State fragility are 
actually designed to group different countries in Africa. In other words, the 
concept created at the top (State fragility) serves to put together realities at the 
bottom (African countries, Third World). However, this article suggests that even 
as this literature points to a general feature of States in Africa - their fragility, it 
does little to offer insightful explanations of that very fragility and the ways to 
measure it. 
State fragility as a “broken mirror” and as analogous 
historiography
I wish to suggest that there exist two differentiated scholar approximations 
to “State fragility”. The first one refers to a political science category useful to 
classify democratic and institutional underdevelopment in the Third World and 
in Africa in particular. In this category I shall include both quantitative statistical 
exercises as the State Failure Task Force (SFTF), and qualitative studies 
designed to offer policy advice. Underestimation of history (either in regional 
and national terms) is a determining feature of this literature. 
The second approximation refers to the need to generate comparative literature 
that entails applying general theories on social mechanisms (mainly Weberian 
and Marxist ones) with the intent of determining the causes of State fragility. It 
is preoccupied with in-depth studies that entail appreciation of critical social 
mechanisms explaining State fragility. However, a major weakness of this second 
approach is that while trying to explain Third World cases much of the historical 
evidence is strongly European-based. 
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State fragility as a broken mirror
In the first approach a fragile State is described as a “quasi-State”, a relatively 
distant irregularity from an ideal category that can be referred to as a liberal-
market-democracy. Typically a fragile State would also be defined as corrupt 
and not free (moral linguistic hedges abound). Several definitions in the litera-
ture do fit in this category. Even if this literature intends to present State fragility 
as a clear cut category, it often involves some conceptualizations derived from 
relatively new ideologies such as neo-liberalism (market democracy), develop-
mental theory (new comers, late developers), and neo-institutionalism (weak 
institutions). State fragility used in this way almost invariably passes quickly 
from a brief description of what a fragile State is to a rapid explanation on how 
it could be avoided. Two examples might serve to illustrate this approach (all 
emphasis mine):
a. “States fail when they are convulsed by civil war, fail to provide political 
goods, and become illegitimate. Research for a Book Manuscript in progress 
suggests several mutually reinforcing paths to failure. Along the economic 
one, rapidly deteriorating standards of living, coupled with the perceived 
unfair arrogation of the remaining financial rewards to a favoured family, 
clan, or small group, accelerates a fall.” (Belfer Center, 2008)
b. Most African States have never had effective institutions, relying instead 
on the personalized networks of patronage. They have never generated 
sustainable growth. Factionalism has always been politically prevalent, and 
States have more often been instruments of predation and extraction than 
tools for the pursuit of public goods. In vast parts of Africa, State failure is 
less an objective condition than a permanent mode of political operation. 
[…] Many are “States that fail[ed] before they form[ed].” Indeed, the evidence 
is overwhelming that most of Africa’s collapsed States at no point in the 
postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type of the modern Western 
polity. The DRC, for example, has never possessed a monopoly on coercion, 
nor has it ever enjoyed the rule of law or an effective bureaucracy. […] The 
absence of checks and balances in failed states provides opportunities for 
rulers to misappropriate public resources. (Englebert, P. and Tull, D., 2008).
Even though many of these reviews mention several pertinent aspects that 
seek to explain State failure such as “the monopoly of force”, “legitimacy”, 
“bureaucratic development”, and “institutional strength”, few of them attempt to 
develop further what they mean by these concepts, neither try to establish how 
to measure them or to describe social mechanisms determining their internal 
structure. 
Within this tradition, a concept like “legitimacy” is rather randomly assumed to 
be related with the celebration of electoral processes, some degree of religious 
unity, or some ideological hegemony within the political systems. No definition 
however is provided, neither suggestion of how to establish its reality on the 
ground. The same can be said about concepts such as “bureaucratic development” 
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and “institutional strength” which are often connected to mean some degree of 
technical expertise and the abundance of rule of law. Even if this is the case 
of a very brief account of Weberian theory, it actually says very little in terms 
of decentralization, territorial control, or in more general terms what Michael 
Mann has called infrastructural power. This is a significant handicap that must 
be addressed when trying to establish the causes of State failure, its measure-
ment and most importantly how to offer advice on how to overcome it.
All in all, the problem with this first approach to State fragility is that it presumes 
to describe the situation of any African country. In attempting to describe havoc 
or civil turmoil, or even economic hardship, State fragility serves very little to 
clarify the causes as well as the intensity of the fragility in a particular country.
State fragility as analogical historiography
More focused and academically rigorous literature centres its study about State 
fragility basing on European and U.S. history. Historically supported models, 
explaining social mechanisms are all too often stretched to “account for” de-
velopments (or underdevelopment) in Africa. One major problem with this 
kind of literature is its lack of “touch” with relevant developments on the 
ground. A great deal of analogous interpretations from Western history often 
end up “looking out” for supporting evidence to fit particular theoretical struc-
tures. This kind of literature often ends up foreseeing outcomes other than 
appreciating and affirming the occurrence of particular trends. Even if a great 
deal of illuminating insight is derived from those exercises in order to under-
stand State fragility, there is always oversimplification (in specific Third World 
case explanations) and generalizations (in comparisons undertaken among 
different cases). 
These characteristics of analogical historiography are highlighted by Alex Maro-
ya in his presentation of Migdal's approach to State fragility:
 – Different types of rents have different implication for State formation. We do 
not have a general theory of the political economy of rentier states. In par-
ticular, our understanding of the political economy of states that depends 
on strategic rents remains relatively rudimentary and contestable. There are 
three broad reasons for this: The first is that strategic rents are very diverse, 
the second is that many of them are relatively hard to quantify and he third 
is that, in the case of development aid in particular, there may be quite 
complex reflexive interactions between the inflow of rents (that is, aid) and 
the character of the state.
 – This kind of approach, based on critical insights on social mechanisms and 
interest based collective action coming from the second tradition described 
in the review above- tries to avoid quick analogies by looking at the “evi-
dence” of State power.
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A very brief description of the methodological endeavours of this logistical 
perspective includes: 
a. Offering a very concise definition of a State that together with the mo-
nopoly of force emphasizes its ability to co-opt society both politically and 
logistically. By adopting such a force and logistical centred perspective, we 
avoid the introduction in the definition of historical outcomes –even if it 
is desirable on how the State exercises its power. Democracy or welfare, 
for example, might not necessarily determine the state’s ability to enforce 
outcomes in society. 
b. Producing a definition that could also be operationalized in such a way 
that each concept could be measured in terms of its projection in society. 
In order to illustrate the meaning of this logistical perspective in analyzing 
African politics, I will use one example provided by Jeffrey Herbs (1989) in 
his study about boundaries in Africa. 
In explaining how the current African boundaries were demarcated, Herbs 
describes a double European concerted policy of keeping a maximum external 
sovereignty through treaties of mutual respect whilst assuming a minimal 
approach to internal sovereignty based in an efficient extraction using relatively 
modest financial efforts. As a result of these arrangements (dating from the 
Berlin conference), African boundaries would have favoured maximum peace 
and at minimum cost in terms of development of administrative structures to 
exert internal control.
Bringing the consequences of this heritage to the present day, Herbs describes 
how the OAU came to use the same double policy. On the one hand, by 
preserving the African borders, it has assumed a likewise approach to external 
sovereignty; on the other hand, by equalizing nation-wide equating sovereignty 
with the effective control of the capital city, the OAU has accepted as a fact the 
logistical difficulties that central governments face in projecting their power to 
different parts of their territories. He indicates “control of the capital is today 
simply the minimal level of government presence that the Europeans first 
defined at the Berlin Congo Conference”.
The historical interpretation provided by Herbs puts some interesting questions. 
If sovereignty has been fundamentally centred on the capital city, what kind of 
consequences has this had for the formation of a dynamic market through the 
incentives for migration to different regions or the formation of middle sized 
cities? How do some countries’ capital cities connect with the rest of the national 
territory? How a certain position of the capital city favoured military control, 
infrastructure or even international trade? Unfortunately no further discussion 
is provided about those topics. I am bound to believe that as while Herb’s 
perspective was mainly African, he could not advance much further into this 
enquiry (for it required more specific country cases analysis).
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In fact it appears that Herbs actually opted for a more easy option as he indeed 
appeared to have found in –yet again– analogical historiography. Indeed, in 
reaching the concluding remarks of his analysis, Herbs appears to adopt uncriti-
cally Tilly’s model of war-make-State and state-make-war. As he indicate
African leaders in the future may come to see war as one way of creating 
stronger political institutions at home. As many European historians have 
noted, the preparation for and the conduct of battles were a driving force 
behind the growth of states in Europe. […] “war made the State, and the 
State made war.” If African leaders judge that the cost of continuing domes-
tic political weakness outweighs the safety provided by the current State 
system, there could be significant efforts to rearrange the map of Africa. 
[…] it should be obvious that the incentives which African leaders have to 
incite wars for the purposes of state-making are already significant and may 
become even stronger in the future when the futility of domestic reform 
during times of “business as usual” (peace) becomes clear. 
By bringing up Herbs analysis, I have shown a very creative research agenda to 
study about the State performance for different countries in Africa; meanwhile, 
I could also show how analogous historiography intended to explain how “Af-
rican politics” can actually block the path toward such agenda.
3. Social mechaniSmS and black boXeS 
In explaining political and social outcomes the scholar has to offer a credible 
or testable account showing how they are the final result of individual beliefs, 
actions, and attitudes; otherwise descriptions would appear to be based in 
unjustifiable and arbitrary emotions. Explaining a social mechanism thus means 
to describe the personal reasons shaping the interaction of individuals. I will 
suggest that in African studies the oversimplification in explaining these social 
mechanisms have favoured a narrow approach on cost-minus-benefit utilitarian 
rationality. For all its simplicity this has favoured nice universal modelling while 
sacrificing explanatory power. 
Indeed, universal descriptions of politicians looting the State and crony networks 
of clientelism destroying institutions are based in a single social mechanism that 
can be read as follows: “I can steal; then I do”. Given the opportunities African 
leaders will maximize their economical interests. Patrimonialism has fit so well 
this description that it has become a replacement for research on what shaped 
differences among countries. As a result a single label appears to be explaining 
the reality of the African State but in the best case it is simply denouncing the 
phenomena. 
Even as we accept patrimonialism as sufficient explanation behind some prac-
tices observed in the politics of some African countries, it is hard to hold as true 
that it is the single most powerful mechanism explaining African politics; in fact, 
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it might be just the iceberg on top of some other more profound constrains and 
balances providing rational meaning (not necessarily cost-minus-benefit) to the 
decisions assumed by those different actors.
Take the case of Mamdani's explanation of the African bifurcated State in its 
consequences for the political interactions of all the social forces around the 
state. A particular structure of differentiated rule (direct and indirect) deter-
mined the outcomes in the transition to independence and then after the intents 
to structure political power throughout Africa. A bifurcated State effectively 
determined not only the way in which the State incorporated the people to its 
rule but also the way in which the people reacted against the power of the state.
Mamdani’s example serves here a double purpose. In the first place it serves to 
highlight the importance of searching for other, less evident, social mechanisms 
shaping social interactions. It invites both to look out throughout Africa for 
interactions deserving an explanation, instead of probing if a certain explana-
tion from European history proves useful for African reality. But it also serves 
to put forward that there is nothing wrong in talking about Africa, only that it 
should be for a worthy, indeed, powerful reason based in a social mechanism; 
in this case a bifurcated State inherited from colonial times.
But apart from the common reference to patrimonialism or other similar labels 
for the greedy tendency of social actors in the African milieu, African studies 
have also a market tendency to put labels or titles to some unexplained 
social mechanisms. Tribalism, ethnic hatred, detachment, etc, are common labels 
bypassing the required explanation of the particular reasons for individuals to 
take part in certain behaviours. The use of these references creates the apparent 
effect of having an explanation but in fact, they only serve to generalize and 
mix cases that should not be together otherwise. 
explaining social mechanisms using the cognitivist model (cm)
To make sense of what people do, utilitarian rationality indicates that individuals 
maximize. However, this maximization requirement implies that false beliefs 
as well as normative beliefs are irrational and so they cannot be accounted for 
in terms of maximization. This means that a misinformed individual following 
his false beliefs cannot be acting rationally just as the ignorant worker is acting 
irrationally when following the false belief of salvation through tirelessly work. 
In the same way, a person’s decision based upon her perception of what is good 
cannot be accepted as rational because it does not maximize her personal well 
being (like cheating). The practical effect is the elimination of alternative analyses 
that accept as rational to take decisions based on either false assumptions or in 
normative beliefs. As the scholar set up to explain why certain individuals take 
such and such decisions, he is either endowed with a greedy-like explanation 
or he simply sidesteps the explanation by adopting a mere label to cover his 
ignorance.
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In order to widen up the options available to the scholar Raymond Boudon 
(1998) proposes to adopt a Cognitivist Model (CM):
“The CM supposes that actions, decisions and beliefs are meaningful to the actor 
in the sense that they are perceived by him as grounded on reasons.”
CM includes utilitarian rationality but also accepts as rational any decision taken 
under the following template: “He did X because he believed that Z is likely or 
true, and he had strong reasons for believing so” or “She did X because she 
believed that Z is fair, good, or unfair, and she had strong “nonconsequencial” 
reasons of believing so.” 
What the individual strongly considers to be likely or true opens the door to 
take into account historical awareness, biographies. Indeed, before rushing to 
stamp greed and corruption as explanatory devises everywhere, we can consider 
certain actions as based upon different, rational considerations. Countries histo-
riography recovers –ironically– its explanatory importance; next to it, a credible 
account of actor’s interpretation of history (even if it is based upon false beliefs) 
takes a fundamental role in explaining his choices. Political movements can be 
better explained under these assumptions.
On the other hand what the individual strongly considers to be fair led us 
to ask for shared values and moral assumptions determining individual’s 
choices. Accounts on ideological trends can stand on their own providing they 
demonstrate how certain sets of axiological evaluations rationally determined a 
particular decision taken by an individual.
Historical, biographical and ideological explanations, together with other clus-
ters of idiosyncratic considerations combine to form the experimental context 
in which decisions appear as meaningful to the individual. In this way as social 
mechanisms emerge, old generalizations melt. In this sense social mechanisms 
are like weak theories explaining (powerfully) relatively few cases.
The invitation is precisely to opt for these weak theories that favour progressive 
inferences capable of accounting for observed regularities, genuine providers of 
final explanations. As Hedström and Swedberg have argued (1996):
The main reason for advocating explanations that directly refer to generative 
mechanisms is, in our opinion, that they provide (or encourage) deeper, 
more direct, and more fine-grained explanations. The search for generative 
mechanisms consequently helps us distinguish between genuine causality 
and coincidental association, and it increases the understanding of why we 
observe what we observe.
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